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master's thesis
UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a
Diplomski rad
2017. urn:nbn:hr:124:079367
Šitum, Jelena
University of Split
Faculty of economics Split

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Šitum, J. (2017). UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad (Master's thesis). Split: University of Split, Faculty of economics Split. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

Šitum, Jelena. "UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad." Master's thesis, University of Split, Faculty of economics Split, 2017. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

Šitum, Jelena. "UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad." Master's thesis, University of Split, Faculty of economics Split, 2017. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

Šitum, J. (2017). 'UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad', Master's thesis, University of Split, Faculty of economics Split, accessed 23 December 2024, https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

Šitum J. UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad [Master's thesis]. Split: University of Split, Faculty of economics Split; 2017 [cited 2024 December 23] Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

J. Šitum, "UTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad", Master's thesis, University of Split, Faculty of economics Split, Split, 2017. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:124:079367

Metadata
TitleUTJECAJ BUNDESBANKE NA INSTITUCIONALNO OBLIKOVANJE ECB-a : Diplomski rad
AuthorJelena Šitum
MentorMario Pečarić (mentor)
MBZ: 008060
GranterUniversity of Split
Faculty of economics Split
Split
Defense date and country2017-05, Croatia
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		SOCIAL SCIENCES
Economics
Finance
Abstract
Diplomski rad analizira i objašnjava razloge dominacije Njemačke i njene središnje banke (Bundesbank) u oblikovanju i provoĎenju monetarne politike ECB-a. U radu se dokazalo kritičkim analiziranjem dosadašnje literature da su najznačajniji razlozi supremacije institucionalnih okvira i provoĎenja monetarne politike od strane Bundesbanke: reputacija Bundesbanke, značajna uloga u povijesti monetarnih aranţmana od strane Njemačke, njemačka marka kao sidro-valuta, te pregovaračka moć Njemačke u procesu kreiranja ECB-a. TakoĎer, uvidom u dosadašnja istraţivanja, potvrĎena je teza o njemačkoj dominaciji u provoĎenju monetarne politike. Budući odnos i značaj njemačkog modela monetarne politike ovisit će o mogućnosti zajedničke monetarne politike u rješavanju divergentnih ekonomskih neravnoteţa eurozone.
Abstract (english)
This thesis analyses and explains the reasons for the domination of Germany and its central bank (Bundesbank) in shaping and implementing the monetary policy of the ECB. This work has proved by critically analyzing the previous literature that the most important reasons for the supremacy of Bundesbank’s institutional frameworks and the implementation of monetary policy: reputation, a significant role in the history of German monetary arrangements, the German Mark as the anchor currency and the negotiating power of Germany in the process of creating the ECB. Furthermore, the examination of the previous research confirms the hypothesis on German domination in the monetary policy implementation. The future relationship and significance of the German monetary policy model will depend on the possibilities of a common monetary policy in addressing divergent economic imbalances in the Eurozone.
Keywords
Keywords (english)
Languagecroatian
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:124:079367
Study programmeTitle: Economics
Study programme type: university
Study level: graduate
Academic / professional title: magistar/magistra ekonomije (magistar/magistra ekonomije)
Type of resourceText
File originBorn digital
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2017-07-10 13:16:58